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Abstract. We present a domain-specific language called SAL (the Stream-
ing Analytics Language) for processing data in a semi-streaming model.
In particular we examine the use case of processing netflow data in order
to identify malicious actors within a network. Because of the large vol-
ume of data generated from networks, it is often only feasible to process
the data with a single pass, utilizing a streaming (O(polylog n) space re-
quirements) or semi-streaming computing model ( O(n · polylog n) space
requirements). Despite these constraints, we are able to achieve an aver-
age of 0.87 for the AUC of the ROC curve for a set of situations dealing
with botnet detection. The implementation of an interpreter for SAL,
which we call SAM (Streaming Analytics Machine), achieves scaling re-
sults that show improved throughput to 61 nodes (976 cores), with an
overall rate of 373,000 netflows per second or 32.2 billion per day. SAL
provides a succinct way to describe common analyses that allow cyber
analysts to find data of interest, and SAM is a scalable interpreter of the
language.
1 Introduction
Cyber security is challenging problem due to the large volume of data that is pro-
duced, the changing nature of the data, and the ever evolving threat landscape.
Cyber analysts need to extract features from a high-throughput stream, create
models that will predict malicious behavior or anomalies, evaluate the results,
and iterate in a continuous cycle of improvement and adjustment. Our work
provides a domain specify language (DSL) for expressing streaming computa-
tions on cyber data, enabling cyber analysts to quickly express machine learning
pipelines to analyze and classify the data. The main contribution of this paper
is to combine within one DSL the ability to succinctly express streaming oper-
ators, vertex-centric graph operations, and machine learning pipelines. We call
this language the Streaming Analytics Language (SAL). While this work focuses
on detecting malicious activity in high-volume cyber data, SAL can be applied
to any streaming problem where the elements of the stream are tuples.
We extract features from a stream of cyber data, where the data generation
rate only allows a single pass. Streaming [23] and semi-streaming [23,11] fit
the requirements. However, it is currently cumbersome to express streaming
operators as no high-level language currently has them as first-class citizens.
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Also, it is often desirable to extract queries in terms of nodes within the graph
of network activity. For example, we may want to gather statistics about the
incoming flow sizes of individual IPs. SAL makes this type of vertex-centric
computation easy to express. Once we have features, we can define a machine
learning pipeline to conduct either supervised or unsupervised machine learning.
Besides the language itself as a contribution, we also present a scalable imple-
mentation that translates SAL into C++ code that runs in parallel on a cluster
of machines. We call this interpreter the Streaming Analytics Machine, or SAM.
We show scaling to 61 nodes on the real-world problem of identifying malicious
traffic from botnets. The example pipeline we describe in this paper can process
over 373,000 netflows per second, or about 32.2 billion per day. We apply the
pipeline to CTU-13 [13], which contains 13 botnet scenarios. Classifying at a
per-netflow basis, across this dataset we achieve an average area under the curve
(AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) of 0.87 with the
median being 0.90. We envision SAL employed as a filter, so that analysts can
concentrate more expensive analysis on a much reduced set.
In Section 2 we present SAL and also walk through a case-study of how SAL
can be used to express a pipeline described in another paper [5]. In Section 3
we describe SAM, the implementation we developed to interpret SAL. Section
4 discusses results of detecting malicious activity and Section 5 presents the
scaling achieved by the system. Section 6 compares our work to related efforts,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 A Language for Streaming and Semi-Streaming
Operations
In this section we discuss streaming and semi-streaming algorithms and define
how the Streaming Analytics Language expresses those algorithms.
Streaming algorithms is a research area where space and temporal require-
ments are polylogarithmic (i.e. O((log n)k) for some k) [23]. Sometimes those
constraints, in particular the temporal complexity, are relaxed [20]. Several al-
gorithms have been published within these constraints: K-medians [4], frequent
items [15], mean/frequency counts [21,8,34], quantiles [3], rarity [9], variance
[4,34], vector norms [8], similarity [9], and count distinct elements [7,22].
While some streaming algorithms operate on the entire stream, we focus
on the sliding window model, where only recent inputs contribute to feature
calculation. We believe the sliding window model is more appropriate for cyber
data, where the environment is constantly changing. The sliding window model
can also be subcategorized into either a window over a time duration, or by the
last n items. Currently SAL only supports expressing windows over the last n
items, but many of the underlying algorithms are easily adapted to temporal
windows, so support would be easy to add.
Many SAL programs have O(N · polylog n) spatial requirements, where N is
the number of vertices in the graph (e.g. IPs) and n is the size of the sliding win-
dow. Generally each vertex undergoes a set of polylogarithmic operations. This is
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similar to semi-streaming [23,11] which has O(n ·polylog n) spatial requirements
for graph algorithms where n is the number of vertices.
SAL is an imperative language. Below is a short example.
Listing 1.1: SAL code example
1 // Preamble Statements
2 WindowSize = 1000 ;
3
4 // Connection Statements
5 Netf lows = VastStream (” l o c a l h o s t ” , 9999 ) ;
6
7 // P a r t i t i o n Statements
8 PARTITION Netf lows By SourceIp , DestIp ;
9 HASH SourceIp WITH IpHashFunction ;
10 HASH DestIp WITH IpHashFunction ;
11
12 // P i p e l i n e Statements
13 VertsByDest = STREAM Netf lows BY DestIp ;
14 Feature1 = FOREACH VertsByDest GENERATE ave ( SrcTotalBytes ) ;
15 F i l t e r e d = FILTER VertsByDest BY Feature1 > 1000
Fig. 1: Visual representation of the SAL program in Listing 1.
Each SAL program has four parts: preamble, partition, connection, and
pipeline statements. Preamble statements allow for global constants to be de-
fined that are used throughout the program. In the above listing, line 2 defines
the default window size, i.e. the number of items in the sliding window.
After the preamble are the connection statements. Line 5 defines a stream of
netflows called Netflows. VastStream tells the SAL interpreter to expect netflow
data of a particular format (we use the same format for netflows as found in the
VAST Challenge 2013: Mini-Challenge 3 dataset [32]). Each participating node in
the cluster receive netflows over a socket on port 9999. The VastStream function
creates a stream of tuples that represent netflows. For the tuples generated by
VastStream, keywords are defined to access the individual fields of the tuple.
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There are several different standard netflow formats. SAL currently supports
one; however, adding other netflow formats is straightforward. You define a C++
std::tuple with the required fields and a function object that accepts a string and
returns an std::tuple. Once a mapping is defined from the desired keyword (e.g.
VastStream) to the std::tuple, this new tuple type can be used in SAL connection
statements. The mapping is defined via the Scala Parser Combinator [26].
Following the connection statements is the definition of how the tuples are
partitioned across the cluster. Line 8 specifies that the netflows should be par-
titioned separately by SourceIp and DestIp. Each node in the cluster acts as an
independent sensor and receives a separate stream of netflows. These indepen-
dent streams are then re-partitioned across the cluster. In this example, each
node is assigned a set of Source IP’s and Destination IP’s using a common hash
function. Hash functions can be defined and mapped to SAL constructs, similar
to how other tuples can be added to SAL. The process is to define a function
object that accepts the tuple type and returns an integer, and then map the
function object to a keyword using the Scala Parser Combinator.
The last part of a SAL program is the pipeline statements which describe
how the data is to be processed. Line 13 logically separates the single Netflow
stream into multiple streams using STREAM <StreamName> BY <Key1, ...>.
In the above example, netflows are separated into streams by the destination IP
address, as can be seen in Figure 1. Only fields that were defined in the partition
statement can be used in the BY clause.
Separating out the netflows by a given set of keys allows the collection of
features based on those keys. Line 14 of Listing 1 demonstrates creating a fea-
ture on the separated streams. For each destination IP address x, an average is
computed on the total bytes sent to x from any IP in the sliding window. In
general, the format for the FOREACH statement is the following:
<FeatureName> = FOREACH <StreamName> GENERATE <Operator>
The available operators are ave, sum, topk, median, and countdistinct. Each of
these operators use a single pass and require polylogarithmic space.
Line 15 gives an example of a FILTER statement. The filter statement allows
conditional down-selection of tuples. Filtered is a partitioned stream of netflows,
partitioned by destination IP, and then down-selected to only allow netflows
through where the average source total bytes is greater than 1000.
Each SAL pipeline has two operating modes: training and testing. In training,
the pipeline is run against a finite set of data with labels, and any features created
by the pipeline will be appended per input tuple. This feature set along with
the labels is used to train a classifier offline. The testing phase then applies the
pipeline to a live stream, transforming each tuple into features, and then applies
the trained classifier to the features to assign a label.
2.1 Case Study
In this section, we take a look at one approach at creating a classifier for detecting
botnets, namely Disclosure [5]. This will help elucidate how SAL can be used
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to create succinct representations of machine learning pipelines that previously
were developed in an ad-hoc fashion. Also, it will demonstrate what cannot be
expressed by SAL. Some of the features created by Disclosure require algorithms
that do not comply with the desired constraints of streaming and semi-streaming.
As such those features cannot be created with SAL. However, our intent with
SAL is to down-select the stream of data to something more manageable for
more intensive study.
A common architecture for botnets is to have a small set of command and
control (C&C) servers that issue commands to a large number of infected ma-
chines, that then perform attacks such as distributed denial-of-service, stealing
data, spam [28], etc. Disclosure focuses on identifying C&C botnet servers.
The first part of the Disclosure pipeline identifies servers. They define servers
as an IP address where the top two ports account for 90% of the flows. This can
be expressed in SAL with the TopK operator, as in the following example:
VertsByDest = STREAM Netf lows BY DestIp ;
Top2 = FOREACH VertsByDest GENERATE topk ( DestPort , 1 0 0 00 , 1 0 0 0 , 2 ) ;
Se rve r s = FILTER VertsByDest BY
top2 . va lue (0 ) + top2 . va lue (1 ) > 0 . 9 ;
As before in Listing 1.1, we stream the netflows by destination IP. Then
with a FOREACH GENERATE statement combined with the topk streaming
operator, we calculate an estimate on the top two ports that receive traffic for
each destination IP. We then follow that with a filter. The value(n) function
returns the frequency of the nth most frequent item (zero-based indexing).
Once the servers have been determined, the authors of Disclosure hypothe-
sized that flow size distributions for C&C servers are distinguishable from benign
servers. An example they give is that C&C generally have a limited number of
commands, and thus flow sizes are limited to a small set of values. On the other
hand, benign servers will generally have a much wider range of values. To detect
these difference between C&C servers and benign servers, they create three dif-
ferent types of features based on flow size: statistical features, autocorrelation
and unique flow sizes. For the statistical features, they extract the mean and
standard deviation for the size of incoming and outgoing flows for each server.
This is easy to express in SAL as seen below. For each IP in the set of servers,
we use the FOREACH GENERATE statement combined with either the ave
operator or var operator.
FlowsizeSumIn = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE ave ( SrcTotalBytes ) ;
FlowsizeSumOut = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE ave ( DestTotalBytes ) ;
FlowsizeVarIn = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE var ( SrcTotalBytes ) ;
FlowsizeVarOut = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE var ( DestTotalBytes ) ;
Disclosure also generates features using autocorrelation on the flow sizes.
The idea is that C&C servers often have periodic behavior that an autocorre-
lation calculation would illuminate. For each server, the sequence flow sizes can
be thought of as a time series. They divide this signal up into 300 second in-
tervals and calculate the autocorrelation of the time series. Unfortunately, we
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are not aware of a streaming algorithm for calculating autocorrelation. As such,
we currently do not allow autocorrelation to be expressed within SAL; mixing
algorithms with vastly different spatial and temporal complexity requirements
would negate many of the benefits of the language. However, if space is not an
issue, adding autocorrelation would be straightforward.
The final set of features based on flow-sizes involves finding the set of unique
flow sizes. The hypothesis here is that botnets have a limited set of messages,
and so the number of unique flow sizes will be smaller than a typical benign
server. To find an estimate on the number of unique flow sizes, one can use the
countdistinct operator:
UniqueIn = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE c o u n t d i s t i n c t ( SrcTotalBytes ) ;
UniqueOut = FOREACH Serve r s GENERATE c o u n t d i s t i n c t ( DestTotalBytes ) ;
However, Disclosure goes a step further. They create an array with the counts
for each unique element and then compute unspecified statistical features on this
array. While this is not exactly expressible in SAL, and having an exact answer
would break our space constraints, one could use TopK to obtain estimated
counts for the most frequent elements.
Fig. 2: This figure demonstrates the use of the TRANSFORM and COLLAPSE
BY statements to define parts of the Disclosure pipeline.
Besides features based on flow size, Disclosure also computes features on
client access patterns. The hypothesis is that all the bots accessing a particular
C&C server will exhibit very similar behavior, while the behavior of clients ac-
cessing benign servers will not be so uniform. Disclosure defines a time series for
each server-client pair by calcuating the inter-arrival times between consecutive
connections. For example, if we had n netflows that occurred at times t0, t1, ...
tn, then the series would be t1−t0, t2−t1, ...,tn−tn−1. To specify this time series
in SAL, one uses the TRANSFORM statement. The TRANSFORM statement
allows one to transform from one tuple representation to another.
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For this example, we need to transform from the original netflow tuple repre-
sentation to a tuple that has three values: the SrcIp, DestIp, and the inter-arrival
time. In the listing below, we first use the STREAM BY statement to further
seprate the stream of netflows into source-destination IP pairs. Then we follow
that with the the TRANSFORM statement that calculates the inter-arrival time.
Since SourceIp and DestIp are the keys defined by the STREAM BY statement,
those values are included by default as the first two values of the newly defined
tuple. This part of the pipeline is represented in the left side of Figure 2.
In the example below, we introduce the prev(i) function. The prev(i) function
returns the value of the related field i items back in time. TimeSeconds.prev(1)
returns the value of TimeSeconds in the tuple that occurred previous to the cur-
rent tuple, thus giving us the inter-arrival time. The colon followed by TimeDiff
gives a label to the tuple value and can be referred to in later SAL statements.
DestSrc = STREAM Serve r s BY DestIp , SourceIp ;
TimeLapseSeries = FOREACH DestSrc TRANSFORM
( TimeSeconds − TimeSeconds . prev ( 1 ) ) : TimeDiff
Now that we have the time series expressed in SAL, we can then add the
feature extraction methods that Disclosure performs on the inter-arrival times.
Disclosure calculates the minimum, maximum, median, and standard deviation.
The median and standard deviation can be expressed in SAL below:
TimeDiffVar = FOREACH TimeLapseSeries GENERATE var ( TimeDiff ) ;
TimeDiffMed = FOREACH TimeLapseSeries GENERATE median ( TimeDiff ) ;
However, maximum and minimum are not currently supported in SAL. The
reason is that max and min require O(n) space where n is the size of the window
when computing over a sliding window [8]. When computing over the entire data
stream, to compute the max/min one can keep track of one number, but the
sliding window adds complexity as the max/min expires. Perhaps some mixture
between the two models, over the entire stream and sliding windows, would be
sufficient for creating features. Also, as with autocorrelation, if space is not an
issue, adding max and min is an easy extension.
For the features derived from the time series to be applicable to classifying
servers, we need to combine the features from all the clients. To do so, we no
longer use SourceIp as one of the keys to separate the data flow by using the
COLLAPSE BY statement. The BY clause contains a list of keys that are
kept. Unspecified keys are removed from the key set. Below, DestIp is kept while
SourceIp is not specified, meaning that it is no longer a key to separate the data.
DestOnly = COLLAPSE TimeLapseSeries BY DestIp FOR TimeDiffVar ,
TimeDiffMed ;
There are different possibilities for the semantics of the COLLAPSE BY
statement. The one that we have implemented is the following: Let k+ be the
tuple elements that are kept by COLLAPSE, and let k− be the tuple elements
that are no longer used as a key. For each tuple t that appears in the stream
S of data, let k+(t) be the subtuple with only tuple elements from k+, and let
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k−(t) be the subtuple with only tuple elements from k−. Also, let r(t) be the
subtuple with remaining elements that are neither in k+(t) nor in k−(t). Define
L to be the set of unique k+(t) for all t ∈ S, i.e. L =
⋃
t∈S k+(t) For each l ∈ L,
we define another set, Ml: Ml =
⋃
t∈S,k+(t)=l k−(t) COLLAPSE BY creates a
mapping for each set Ml, mapping the elements of Ml to the most recently seen
r(t) associated with each m ∈Ml. These mappings can then be operated on by
the FOREACH GENERATE statement.
Once we have collapsed back to DestIp, we can then calculate statistics across
the set of clients for each server. The Disclosure paper does not specify which
statistics are calculated, but below we give some examples.
AveTimeDiffVar = FOREACH DestOnly GENERATE ave ( TimeDiffVar ) ;
VarTimeDiffVar = FOREACH DestOnly GENERATE var ( TimeDiffVar ) ;
That concludes our exploration of how SAL can be used to express concepts
from a real pipeline defined in another paper. While there are some operations
that are not supported, e.g. the autocorrelation features and max/min, most of
the features could be expressed in SAL. We believe SAL provides a succinct way
to express streaming machine learning pipelines. In the next sections we discuss
how SAL is interpreted with a specific implementation.
3 Implementation
Here we discuss how SAL runs in parallel across a cluster. We translate SAL
with the Scala Parser Combinator Library [26]. We express SAL’s grammar and
map those elements to C++ code that utilizes a prototype parallel library that
we wrote to execute SAL programs called the Streaming Analytics Machine, or
SAM. For the Disclosure pipeline, SAL uses 20 lines of code while SAM needs
520 lines. For another pipeline we discuss in Section 4, SAL requires 34 lines
while SAM needs 520. Overall, SAL uses 10-25 times fewer lines.
SAM is architected so that each node in the cluster receives tuple data.
Right now for the prototype, the only ingest method is a simple socket layer. In
maturing SAM, other options such as Kafka [14] is an obvious alternative. We
then use ZeroMQ [1] to distribute the tuples across the cluster.
For each tuple that a node receives, it performs a hash for each key specified
in the PARTITION statement, and sends the tuple to the node assigned that
key. For our experiments we partition on both source IP and dest IP, meaning
that for each netflow a node receives over the socket layer, it sends the same
netflow twice over ZeroMQ (if the netflow is not kept locally). Many different
messaging styles can be expressed by ZeroMQ. We make use of the push/pull
paradigm of ZeroMQ. Each node creates n−1 push sockets and n−1 pull sockets,
where n is the size of the cluster.
Conceptually, many of the statements and operators map to either consumers
and/or producers, which we implement with C++ classes. The prototype imple-
mentation reads netflow data from a socket, so the class ReadSocket reads from
the socket and is considered the original source of the stream. A ZeroMQPush-
Pull instance, acting as a consumer, takes the data from the ReadSocket and
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distributes the netflow data across the cluster using the push sockets. The same
ZeroMQPushPull instance uses the pull sockets to collect the netflows destined
for it. It then collects those netflows in a queue and once full, calls a parallel feed
method. The feed method provides the contents of the queue to all registered
consumers in parallel.
Often consumers generate features. Each node creates a thread-safe feature
map to collect features that are generated. The function signatures is as follows:
update Inse r t ( s t r i n g key , s t r i n g featureName , Feature f )
The key is generated by the key fields specified in the STREAM BY statement.
The featureName comes from the identifier specified in the FOREACH GEN-
ERATE statement. For example, in the below SAL snippet, the key is created
by using a string hash function on the concatenation of the source IP and desti-
nation IP. The identifier is Feature1 as specified in the FOREACH GENERATE
statement. The scheme for ensuring thread-safety in the feature map comes from
Goodman et al. [16].
DestSrc = STREAM Netf lows BY SourceIp , DestIp ;
Feature1 = FOREACH DestSrc GENERATE ave ( SrcTotalBytes ) ;
The Project class provides the functionality of the COLLPASE statement.
The Project class creates features similar to the Feature Creator classes, but they
cannot be accessed directly through the API. The features are Map features,
in other words the sets Ml using the terminology from Section 2.1. These Map
features are added to the same feature map used for all other generated features.
These Map features can then be used by the CollapsedConsumer class, which
can be specified to calculate statistics on the map for each kept key in the stream.
4 Classifier Results
To validate the value of SAL in expressing pipelines and in filtering out benign
data, we used a simple program where we separate the netflows two ways, by
destination IP and by source IP. Then we create features based on the ave and
var streaming operators for each of the fields: SrcTotalBytes, DestTotalBytes,
DurationSeconds, SrcPayloadBytes, DestPayloadBytes, SrcPacketCount and
DestPacketCount. This results in 28 total features.
We apply this pipeline to CTU-13 [13]. CTU-13 has nice characteristics,
including: 1) Real botnet attacks: Virtual machines were created and infected.
2) Real background traffic: Traffic from their university router was captured
at the same time as the botnet traffic. The botnet traffic was bridged into the
university network. 3) A variety of protocols and behaviors: The scenarios cover
a range of protocols that were used by the malware such as IRC, P2P, and HTTP.
Also some scenarios sent spam, others performed click-fraud, port scans, DDoS
attacks, or Fast-Flux. 4) A variety of bots: The 13 scenarios use 7 different bots.
SAL program inherently encodes historical information. As such we can’t
treat each netflow independently and thus can’t create random subsets of the
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data as is usual in a cross-validation approach. We instead split each scenario
into two parts. We want to keep the number of malicious netflows about the
same in each part (we need enough examples to train on), so we find the point
in the scenario timewise where the malicious examples are balanced. Namely
we have two sets, P1 and P2, where ∀n1 ∈ P1,∀n2 ∈ P2, T imeSeconds(n1) <
TimeSeconds(n2) and |Malicious(P1)| ≈ |Malicious(P2)|, where TimeSeconds
returns the time in seconds of the netflow and Malicious returns a subset of the
provided set of all the malicious netflows in the provided set. With each scenario
split into two parts, we train on the first part and test on the second part. Then
we switch: train on the second and test on the first. We make use of a Random
Forest Classifier as implemented in scikit-learn [24].
After generating the 28 features, we performed a greedy search over them to
down-select to the most important ones. We added features one at a time until
no improvement is found in the average AUC over the 13 scenarios. The following
eight features provided the best performance across the 13 scenarios. They are
listed in the order they were added using the greedy approach above: 1) Average
DestPayloadBytes, 2) Variance DestPayloadBytes, 3) Average DestPacketCount,
4) Variance DestPacketCount, 5) Average SrcPayloadBytes, 6) Average SrcPack-
etCount, 7) Average DestTotalBytes, and 8) Variance SrcTotalBytes.
Using the above eight features, Figure 3 shows the AUC of the ROC for each
of the 13 scenarios. In four scenarios, 1, 3, 6, and 11, training on either half was
sufficient for the other half, with AUCs between 0.926 and 0.998. Some scenarios,
namely 2, 5, 8, 12, and 13, the first half was sufficient to obtain AUCs between
0.922 and 0.992 on the second half, but the reverse was not true. For scenario
10, training on the second half was predictive of the first half, but not the other
way. Scenario 9 had AUCs of 0.820 and 0.887, which is decent, but lackluster
compared to the other scenarios. The classifier had issues with scenarios 4 and 7.
Scenario 7 did not perform well, probably because there were only 63 malicious
netflows. We are not sure why the classifier struggled with scenario 4.
5 Scaling
For our scaling experiments, we use Cloudlab [25], a set of clusters distributed
across three sites, Utah, Wisconsin, and South Carolina, where researchers can
provision a set of nodes to their specifications. We created an image where our
code, SAM, was deployed and working, and then replicated that image to a
cluster size of our choice. In particular we make use of the Clemson system in
South Carolina. The Clemson system has 16 cores per node, 10 Gb/s Ethernet
and 256 GB of memory. We were able to allocate a cluster with 64 nodes.
Figure 4 shows the weak scaling results. Weak scaling examines the solution
time where the problem size scales with the number of nodes, i.e. there is a
fixed problem size per node. For our experiments, each node was fed one million
netflows. Thus, for n nodes, the total problem size is n million netflows. Each
node had available the entire CTU dataset concatenated into one file. Then we
randomly selected for each node a contiguous chunk of one million netflows. For
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Fig. 3: AUC of the ROC
Fig. 4: Weak Scaling Results Fig. 5: Weak Scaling Efficiency.
each chunk, we renamed the IP addresses to simulate a larger network instead of
replaying the same IP addresses, just from different time frames. For comparison
we also ran another round with completely random IP addresses, such that an
IP address had very little chance of being in multiple netflows. This helped us
determine if scaling issues on realistic data were from load balancing problems
or some other issue. Each point is the average of three runs.
In Figure 4 we see the renamed IP set of runs peaks out at 61 nodes or 976
cores where we obtain a throughput of 373,000 netflows per second or 32.2 billion
per day. For the randomized IP set of runs, the scaling is noticeably steeper,
reaching a peak throughput of 515,000 netflows per second (44.5 billion per day)
with 63 nodes. Figure 5 takes a look at the weak scaling efficiency. This is defined
as E(n) = T1/Tn, where Ti is the time taken by a run with i nodes. Efficiency
degrades quicker for the renamed IP set of runs while the randomized IP runs
hover close to 0.4. We believe the difference is due to load balance issues. For
the randomized IP set of runs, the work is completely balanced between all 64
nodes. The renamed IP runs are more realistic, akin to a power law distribution,
where a small set of nodes account for most of the traffic. In this situation, it
becomes difficult to partition the work evenly across all the nodes.
As far as we know, we are the first to show scalable distributed network anal-
ysis on a cluster of size 64 nodes. The most direct comparison in terms of scaling
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is Bumgardner and Marek [6]. In this work, they funnel netflows through a 10
node cluster running Storm [30]. They call their approach a hybrid stream/batch
system because it uses Storm to stream netflow data into a batch system, Hadoop
[17], for analysis. The stream portion is what is most similar to our work. Over
the Storm pipeline, they achieve a rate of 234,000 netflows per second, or about
23,400 netflows per second, per node. Our pipeline with ten nodes achieved a
rate of 13,900 netflows per second, per node. However, their pipeline is much
simpler. They do not partition the netflows by IP and calculate features. The
only processing they undergo during streaming is adding subnet information to
the netflows, which does not require partitioning across the cluster.
In terms of botnet identification, Botfinder [31] and Disclosure [5] report
single node batch performance numbers. Our approach on a single 16-core node
achieved a rate of 30,500 netflows per second. For Botfinder, they extract 5
features on a 12 core Intel Core i7 chip, achieving a rate of 46,300 netflows per
second. Disclosure generates greater than nine features (the text is ambiguous)
on a 16 core Intel Xeon CPU E5630. They specify that they run the feature
extraction for one day’s worth of data in 10 hours and 53 minutes, but they do
not clearly state if that is on both data sets they chose to evaluate or just one.
If it is both, the rate is roughly 40,000 netflows per second.
6 Related Work
There are many frameworks that provide streaming APIs. Prominent among
them are Apache Storm [30], Apache Spark [29], Apache Flink [2], and Apache
Heron [18]. Each has different advantages and short comings. Many perform
checkpointing to allow for replay in case of failure. However, the price of check-
pointing may be too significant a cost to justify for our application. Our stream-
ing calculations are by definition approximations, so some lost data may be
acceptable. Zhang et al. [33] report success in adapting Storm as the backend of
a streaming C-SPARQL engine [12], while Spark has significantly longer laten-
cies. In our own experiments, we found Spark Streaming to have trouble scaling
to the node counts we used. We have also experimented with Flink, which has a
wealth of implemented streaming concepts that are a natural fit for SAL. So far
we’ve found mixed results SAM vs Flink, but that is outside the current scope
of this paper will be reported in future work. In any case, our main contribution
in this paper is the domain specific language for expressing cyber queries. The
underlying implementation can be changed and adapted as technology evolves.
In terms of domain specific languages, there are several graph-related DSL’s
that allow for vertex-centric computations, similar to our feature calculations on
a per vertex basis. DSL’s like Green-Marl [19] and Ligra [27] provide succint ways
to express graph computations, but they are limited to shared-memory infras-
tructures. Other approaches like Gluon [10] provide a mechanism for converting
shared-memory approaches to distributed settings. Regardless of whether these
DLS approaches are computationally distributable, a fundamental difference be-
tween this set of work and our own is the streaming aspect of our aproach and
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domain. The algorithmic solutions, partitioning, operation scheduling, and data
processing of these graph DSL’s rely upon the assumption of static data. Also,
these approaches do not have a way of expressing machine learning pipelines.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a new domain specific language, the Streaming Analytics
Language, or SAL, that is designed to easily express analytical pipelines on
streaming data. We specifically examined the case of cyber data and showed
how it can extract features from netflow data which can then be used to train a
classifier using labeled data. Using the CTU-13 dataset as an example, we were
able to train classifiers on streaming features that on average obtained an AUC
of 0.87. In an operational setting, this could be used to greatly reduce the amount
of traffic needing to be analyzed. SAL can be used as a first pass over the data
using space and temporally-efficient streaming algorithms. After down-selecting,
more expensive algorithms can be applied to the remaining data.
In addition to SAL, we also presented the results of our scalable interpreter
of SAL, which we call the Streaming Analytics Machine, or SAM. On real data,
we are able to scale to 61 nodes and 976 cores, obtaining a throughput of 373,000
netflows per second or 32.2 billion per day. On completely load-balanced data,
we obtain greater efficiency out to 64 nodes than the real data, indicating that
SAM could be improved with a more intelligent partitioning strategy. In the end,
we have an easy to use domain specific language and a scalable implementation
to back it that has good accuracy on the target problem.
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